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Introduction 
This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part analyses the development of 
social security provisions for the unemployed in the UK and describes the shift 
away from a more passive approach, in which the main function of social security 
was to prevent hardship, towards a more active approach, in which the main func-
tion of social security is to get unemployed people back into work. This shift has 
involved the integration of social security policies and employment policies, which 
were formerly relatively autonomous policy areas in the United Kingdom. The pas-
sive approach was in the ascendancy for the first 40 years after World War 2 while 
the active approach has increased in importance over the last 15-20 years. The first 
part of the chapter concludes by describing the two main elements of the active ap-
proach, the Jobseekers Allowance, which was introduced by the Conservatives in 
1996, and the New Deal, a set of programmes that have been introduced by New 
Labour after its return to government in 1997 and are one of its flagship welfare re-
forms. These developments are analysed at a macro and a micro level. The second 
part of the chapter focuses on these developments to the macro level. It refers to the 
government’s dissatisfaction with the emphasis in the passive approach on rights 
and its neglect of responsibilities. It explores the shift away from a contribution-
based approach to citizenship, in which rights to benefit are derived from work and 
the payment of insurance contributions, first to a status-based approach to citizen-
ship, in which rights to benefit apply to everyone who qualifies on income grounds, 
and then to a reciprocity-based approach to citizenship, in which rights to benefit 
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are dependent on the individual’s behaviour. The third part of the chapter focuses 
on these developments to the micro level. It explores the shift away from a more 
bureaucratic and legalistic type of decision-making towards a more professional 
and managerial one, and examines the implications of this shift for rights of redress 
and accountability. 
The development of social security provisions for the unem-
ployed in the UK and the shift from a passive to an active 
approach 
The Beveridge Legacy 
The Beveridge Report1 proposed and the post-war Labour government introduced, 
with some modifications, a universal scheme of contributory social insurance 
against a range of misfortunes that people encounter in the course of their lives.2 In 
return for what were initially flat-rate, but soon became earnings-related, contribu-
tions, people received flat-rate benefits when they were no longer able to support 
themselves financially, e.g. as a result of an accident at work or through unem-
ployment, sickness, disability or old age. The aim was to prevent want (or poverty) 
by providing a decent level of income as of right and without resort to a means test. 
Beveridge had assumed that, in peacetime, men would go out to work and earn 
enough to support their wives and children, while their wives would stay at home 
and look after the family. However, to contribute to the costs of child rearing, the 
government introduced flat-rate family allowances financed out of taxation3. Men 
who were unable to work could claim social insurance benefits, which were in-
tended to meet the needs of everyone in the household. Thus, men could claim al-
lowances for their wives and dependent children. Although successive governments 
did not abolish means-tested social assistance, it was widely believed that, over 
time, the number of people who were forced to rely on it would decline to a bare 
minimum. This optimistic prognosis followed from two assumptions. The first of 
these was that, by introducing a free National Health Service, the health of the 
population would improve and the number of people who would not be able to 
work on grounds of sickness would decline. The second was that, through Keynes-
ian demand management, full employment would be achieved and the number of 
people unable to find work would be very small indeed. Although an employment 
service was set up, its main functions were to provide careers advice, particularly 
for young people, and to match potential employers with potential employees – it 
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was certainly not to pressurise the unemployed back into work. Policy makers as-
sumed that everyone would prefer work to unemployment. 
As it turned out, both the assumptions referred to above turned out to be false. 
In spite of a free National Health Service, the demand for health care continued to 
rise and, after a period of near full employment, unemployment began to rise too. 
Both of these developments had major implications for social security and, contrary 
to the optimistic prognosis outlined above, the number of benefit claims from sick 
and unemployed people did not decline. In this chapter, I shall focus on the impli-
cations of rising unemployment for social security. 
As unemployment began to rise in the 1960s, people experienced longer spells 
of unemployment and many of them exhausted their rights to contributory unem-
ployment benefit. Although Beveridge had recommended that unemployment bene-
fit should last until the unemployed person had found another job, the post-war La-
bour government had limited the payment of unemployment benefit to 12 months. 
After that, the increasing numbers of long-term unemployed had to rely on means-
tested social assistance. In addition, because many young people were unable to 
find employment, they did not acquire the contribution records that would have en-
titled them to unemployment benefit. They, and others who experienced intermit-
tent spells of unemployment, also had to rely on social assistance. The number of 
single parent households headed by women, most of whom had not paid contribu-
tions and were therefore not entitled to unemployment (or any other contributory) 
benefit also increased. Thus, by the 1960s, it was clear that more and more people 
were falling through the social insurance net and becoming dependant on social as-
sistance. However, instead of increasing the scope and coverage of social insur-
ance, as it might have been expected to do, the incoming Labour government4 de-
cided instead to strengthen social assistance, which was ‘re-launched’ as supple-
mentary benefit (the forerunner of today’s income support and the social fund) in 
1966. 
These developments had a number of consequences. As far as the unemployed 
were concerned, it institutionalised a two-tier structure of social security provisions, 
comprising unemployment insurance for those who met the contribution conditions 
for 12 months and supplementary benefit for those who did not.5 Those who were 
dependent on supplementary benefit, comprised school leavers and other young 
people who had not been in work long enough to fulfill the contribution require-
ments and the ‘long-term’ unemployed who had exhausted their entitlement to un-
employment benefit. 
Until 1966, unemployment (and sickness) benefit were paid at a flat rate that 
did not take into account previous earnings. However, in 1966, earnings-related 
supplements (ERS) to these benefits were introduced − in the case of unemploy-
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ment benefit, the earnings-related supplement lasted for six months. Unemploy-
ment (and sickness) benefits were not taxable and those who were unemployed for 
short periods often received tax rebates and were subject to less tax if/when they 
returned to work.6 By the end of the 1960s, the average replacement rate for the 
first 13 weeks of unemployment was 87% and, for 35.2% of the unemployed, it 
was higher than 90%.7 The government soon began to express concern that this 
situation might reduce the incentive for the unemployed to move into paid em-
ployment. 
This phenomenon, known as the unemployment trap,8 had been recognised by 
Beveridge who had argued, in his 1942 Report, that ‘it is dangerous to allow benefit 
during unemployment or disability to equal or exceed earnings during work… 
…[and that]… the gap between income during earning and during interruption of 
earning should be as large as possible’9. This was achieved by keeping benefit lev-
els for the unemployed low and, for low paid workers, by resorting to the wage 
stop, which limited the amount of social assistance an unemployed person could 
receive to what that person would be earning if he/she had been in work. However, 
because the government was, in due course, persuaded that it was wrong for the so-
cial security system to pay benefits at less than subsistence level during periods of 
high unemployment, the wage stop was used less and less and it was eventually 
abolished in 1975. 
The government introduced a series of measures to deal with the disincentive 
effects of the unemployment trap. These involved a mixture of carrots and sticks. 
During the 1970s, it introduced a range of means-tested benefits, which were de-
signed to boost the incomes of people in low paid employment. These included 
Family Income Supplement (the forerunner of today’s Tax Credits) – introduced in 
197110 – for families with dependent children, and rent and rate rebates (the fore-
runners of today’s Housing and Council Tax Benefit) – introduced in 1972 – which 
provided assistance with rent and rates. Between 1979, when the Conservative 
Party (led by Margaret Thatcher) returned to office, and 1988, a plethora of policy 
changes,11 which included abolishing the earnings-related supplement and making 
benefits liable to taxation, led to a substantial reduction in the incomes of the un-
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employed. By the early 1980s, the average replacement rate for the first 13 weeks 
of unemployment had fallen to 60% and, for only 2.9% of the unemployed, was it 
higher than 90%.12 However, the increased reliance on means-tested benefits cre-
ated another problem, known as the poverty trap.13 
During the 1980s, some low paid workers faced marginal tax rates of more than 
100 per cent.14 This meant that an increase in earnings could actually leave them 
worse off than they were before unless their earnings rose substantially and this fu-
elled demands for substantial wage increases. By reducing tax rates and altering the 
rates (known as ‘tapers’) at which means-tested benefits are withdrawn, the number 
of people experiencing marginal tax rates of 100 per cent was reduced, although the 
numbers experiencing marginal tax rates of 60-80 per cent actually increased. More 
recently, the introduction of a national minimum wage in 1997 has undoubtedly re-
duced the severity of this problem. 
The Balance between Help and Control 
Policies towards the unemployed have always involved a mixture of help and con-
trol. 
Help has taken two forms. First, social security benefits have provided a 
substitute income that, however inadequate it may have been, has pre-
vented destitution; second, employment services have provided help, which 
has sometimes included training, in finding new employment. 
Control has taken a number of forms. From the start of the contributory un-
employment benefit scheme in 1911, unemployed persons could be dis-
qualified from benefit if: 
• they left work ‘without good cause’, 
• they were dismissed for ‘misconduct’, and 






The justification for these penalties is that they were needed to protect the integrity 
of the national insurance fund. In private insurance, people who are deemed to be 
responsible for their own misfortune do not receive insurance payments. In social 
insurance, the rules are not quite so strict but it has always been argued that those 
who bring their misfortune on themselves should not be able to make a claim on the 
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fund in the same way as those who experience misfortune through no fault of their 
own. 
Although unemployed persons could be disqualified from unemployment bene-
fit for periods of up to six weeks15, they could still claim means-tested social assis-
tance, although this was reduced to below subsistence level (the deduction was 40 
per cent of the value of the personal allowance for a single claimant of their age). 
The Paradox of Control 
During the years of low unemployment, from the 1940s until the 1960s, the control 
function was relatively unimportant. However, during the years of high unemploy-
ment, from the 1970s until the 1990s, it became much more important. There is 
something of a paradox in this: one might think that, as far as the unemployed are 
concerned, controls against abuse of the benefits system would be greater when 
work was easy to obtain (because unemployment was low) than when work was 
hard to find (because unemployment was high). In fact, the reverse is the case. 
In the early 1970s, the government decided that the employment service was too 
closely associated with the system of unemployment benefits – unemployed per-
sons ‘signed on’, they were assessed for benefit, and they sought information about 
employment opportunities in the same place. The following quotation, from a De-
partment of Employment publication16, makes it clear why a change of policy was 
thought to be necessary. 
‘The majority of workers who register with the employment office are those 
claiming unemployment benefits. For this reason, the service is regarded by 
many workers as a service for the unemployed – and mainly for manual workers 
at that. … The task facing the service is to break out of the situation where em-
ployers do not use it because they doubt – somewhat rightly – whether it has 
suitable people on its books and where workers seeking jobs do not visit the local 
employment office because the vacancies they want are not notified by the em-
ployer.’ 
The Government decided that, if the employment service was to be an active force 
in the labour market, its links with the benefit system would have to be weakened. 
In accordance with this philosophy, it set up a network of Job Centres, run by the 
Manpower Services Commission. Many of these Job Centres were located in shop 
fronts in the main shopping areas of our towns and cities where they still are today. 
However, one consequence of this divorce was that, because employment service 
staff were reluctant to get involved with the control mechanisms referred to above, 
social security staff were instructed to enforce them more strictly. 
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In the late 1980s, the policy was put into reverse. The Manpower Services 
Commission was abolished and its functions were taken over by the Department of 
Employment. A quotation from a later Department of Employment publication17 
makes the thinking behind the policy reversal clear. 
‘Many of those who are genuinely unemployed have lost touch with the jobs mar-
ket. That is why the separate management of the Job Centre network and the Un-
employment Benefit Service no longer makes any sense. Over recent years, un-
employed people have continued to attend benefit offices, but their contact with 
Job Centres has often been limited to occasional scrutiny of the self-service dis-
plays. There has been no opportunity for Job Centre staff to advise them regu-
larly and individually about the jobs, training and other opportunities available. 
It is in no-one’s interest that unemployed people remain out of touch with the 
jobs market and become passive recipients of unemployment benefits.’ 
Thus, the wheel came full circle. The last 15-20 years have seen the increasing in-
tegration of help and control for the unemployed, with the two functions now dis-
charged by a single agency, Jobcentre Plus. This agency administers the payment of 
benefits for the unemployed but its main function is to ‘persuade’ the unemployed, 
using a mixture of carrots and sticks, to get back into the labour market, either di-
rectly by finding a job or indirectly by undertaking training to improve their em-
ployability. 
The establishment of Jobcentre Plus in 2002 reflected a new mode of govern-
ance for social security. The Employment Service, which had been part of the De-
partment for Education and Employment (DfEE), was transferred to the Depart-
ment of Social Security (DSS) and the DSS was renamed the Department for Work 
and Pensions (DWP). This change was associated with the introduction of an indi-
vidualised service in which Personal Advisers meet claimants to discuss their work 
aspirations and options; assist them in searching for jobs; explore their training 
needs and the availability of training programmes; advise them on childcare and the 
availability of specialist services, such as services for those with drug or alcohol 
dependency; and make indicative calculations about whether or not they would be 
better off in work or on benefit.18 It was made possible by the transfer of front-line 
staff from the Employment Service, who had a more ‘professional’ orientation to 
their work than their counterparts from the Benefits Agency, whose orientation was 
more ‘administrative’.19 In parallel with this change, the role of the Treasury 
changed from that of providing resources for the DSS to enable it to implement its 
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agenda (which had been its role in the past) to that of monitoring the services pro-
vided, on a quasi-contractual basis,20 by the DWP and its agencies.21 
Active and Passive Intervention 
It is sometimes said of the Beveridge scheme of social insurance that it was essen-
tially passive.22 By this is meant that the post-war social security system that was 
inspired by Beveridge was designed to respond to the circumstances of people’s 
lives but not to influence them. 
This passive approach implies that the main function of social security is to 
prevent hardship. It does so by providing a replacement income for the male 
breadwinner who loses his job. Unemployment benefit was initially regarded as a 
temporary expedient that would only be required for a short period (it lasted for 12 
months) until the unemployed man found a new full-time job. Although single 
women were eligible for unemployment benefit, married women were regarded as 
being outside the unemployment benefit scheme because their role was that of wife 
and mother and, if they worked, they only did so on a part-time basis when the 
children had left home. 
When unemployment began to increase and the two-parent household began to 
break down, the inadequacies of unemployment benefit became apparent. The 
number of long-term unemployed persons and the number of single parents started 
to increase and social assistance became the main source of support for them. In an 
attempt to prevent hardship, the government responded by introducing higher bene-
fit rates for the long-term unemployed who were dependent on supplementary 
benefit (the forerunner of income support), and additional payments to lone parents 
in receipt of child benefit and income support. However, this approach did not last 
for long and soon gave way to the more active approach that has been adopted in 
the last 15-20 years. 
The active approach implies that the main function of social security is to 
change people’s labour market behaviour – mainly by placing much greater empha-
sis on getting unemployed people into work and discouraging them from relying on 
benefits. This involved reducing benefit levels, tightening up on the eligibility rules 
for unemployment insurance, increasing the use of means-tested unemployment as-
sistance and attempting to change people’s lifestyle choices, e.g. by reducing bene-
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fits for single parents with the aim of making life as a lone parent less attractive and 
encouraging them to take work, live with relatives or find a new partner. 
The first approach, which is the one put forward in the Beveridge Report, was 
the dominant one for more than 40 years while the second approach has been in-
creasing in importance over the last 15-20 years. It began to take hold in the late 
1980s under the governments of Margaret Thatcher and John Major and should not 
only be associated with Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. 
Following the example of the Reagan administration in the USA, the first two 
Conservative governments led by Margaret Thatcher23 adopted an increasingly neo-
liberal approach to policy – employment rights were reduced, wages councils abol-
ished and benefit levels reduced. After the 1987 general election, the government’s 
approach to the unemployed and the welfare state government changed quite dra-
matically. The overall aim of policy became that of reducing welfare dependency 
by restricting benefit eligibility and policing the job-seeking behaviour of the un-
employed more closely. The Department of Employment was given the primary 
task of re-motivating and improving the employability of those who had given up 
looking for work.  
By the end of the decade, new legislation had re-defined the position of those 
without work. Most unemployed 16 and 17 year olds lost the right to Income Sup-
port, in return for which they were offered a place on a Youth Training Scheme 
(YTS), and the claims of those above that age, in particular the longer-term unem-
ployed, were scrutinised more rigorously. The previous requirement that claimants 
should be ‘available for work’ was replaced by a stronger requirement that they 
should be ‘actively seeking work’. In addition, everyone who had been unemployed 
for six months was offered a ‘voluntary’ Restart interview, in which they were 
given advice and information about training and encouraged to agree on a course of 
action that would get them back into work. 
By 1995, a much stricter benefits regime was in place. Compulsory conditions 
were imposed on those who failed to find employment and the use of sanctions for 
those who did not meet them was stepped up. However, ‘carrots’ were used as well 
as ‘sticks’. The Department of Employment became involved in promoting in-work 
benefits, and claimants were increasingly given in-work benefit assessments along-
side the reviews of their job-seeking activities. These in-work benefits (involving 
assessments of entitlement to Family Credit, for those with dependent children, 
Housing Benefit, for tenants, and Council Tax Benefit) were intended to ameliorate 
the unemployment trap and encourage the low-paid to take jobs that were increas-
ingly being generated in the deregulated labour market. 
When the Labour Party was returned to government in 1997, it did not attempt 
to put the clock back but set out to develop a new ‘Third Way’ which incorporated 
some of the neo-liberal ideas that had been put in place by the Conservatives, while 
maintaining its social democratic commitment to social justice.24 Its centrepiece 
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was the New Deal, a set of policies that the new government announced in its first 
budget in 1997. The avowed aim of these policies was to get young people, single 
parents and the long-term unemployed into work, in the belief that, for those who 
are able to work, work is the best guarantor of welfare. A distinction was made be-
tween those who were able to work, who were to be helped and/or cajoled into 
work by one of six New Deal programmes – the New Deals for Young People (un-
der 25), the Over 25s, for Over 50s, the Partners of Unemployed People, Disabled 
people, and Lone Parents – and those who were not able to work, who would con-
tinue to receive ‘unconditional’ support from social security. A number of separate 
‘businesses’ were set up to deliver benefits and services, one of which (Jobcentre 
Plus) has agency status and provides benefits and services to everyone, except dis-
abled people and their carers, who is of working age.25. 
Initial funding for the New Deal was provided by a £5 billion ‘windfall tax’ on 
the profits of recently privatised public utilities. The key feature of the New Deal, 
which distinguished it from previous initiatives, was the provision of support tai-
lored to the needs and circumstances of its client groups. Programmes are specific 
to target groups (such as young people or lone parents), a range of provision is of-
fered within each programme, and, most importantly, each participant has a New 
Deal Personal Advisor (NPDA) whose role is to provide individualised and con-
tinuous support during the period of participation in the New Deal.26 
Although the periodic, work-related interviews (known as ‘Restart interviews’), 
which were introduced for the longer-term unemployed in 1986, were compulsory, 
in the sense that claimants’ benefits could be reduced or withdrawn if they refused 
to attend ‘without good cause’, and attendance at work-focused training courses 
such as ‘Employment Training’ was a condition of entitlement to benefit, New La-
bour chose to emphasise the punitive elements of the Conservative legacy.27 Under 
compulsory New Deal programmes,28 increased sanctions, including the ‘full fam-
ily sanction’, which allows for the reduction of all the benefits claimed by the 
household, were introduced and the extent of compulsion has increased. 
Jobseekers Allowance and the New Deal 
Jobseekers Allowance (JSA), which replaced the combination of contributory un-
employment benefit and means-tested income support by a single benefit with uni-
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ent client groups distinguishes the New Deal from activation programmes in other liberal welfare states, 
e.g. in Australia and the USA. See Carney (2005). 
27 See Bryson (2003, p. 82). 
28 The New Deals for Young People and for the Over 25s are compulsory, while those for Lone Parents, 
Disabled People, the Over 50s and Partners are voluntary. 




fied rules, was introduced in 1996. It was designed to emphasise the responsibility 
of the unemployed to take advantage of every opportunity offered to them to return 
to work.29 Since then everyone in receipt of JSA has been required to enter a ‘Job-
seekers Agreement’ specifying the detailed weekly steps that they are expected to 
take in looking for work. These activities are monitored at fortnightly intervals. In 
addition to imposing sanctions for misconduct, voluntarily leaving work without 
just cause and refusal or failure to apply for or accept a job vacancy, JSA officials 
were given a new discretionary power to issue a ‘Jobseekers Direction’, which re-
quires those in receipt of JSA to look for jobs in particular ways, take specific steps 
to ‘improve their employability’ or take part in a training scheme.  
The duration of the sanction for misconduct, voluntarily leaving work without 
just cause and refusal or failure to apply for or accept a job vacancy is a discretion-
ary matter and claimants can now be disqualified from benefit for a period of up to 
26 weeks.30 By contrast, claimants who breach a ‘Jobseeker’s Direction’ are dis-
qualified from benefit for a fixed period of two-weeks or, in the event of a further 
breach within the next 12 months, for four weeks.31 Since the introduction of the 
New Deal, the sanctions that formerly applied only to work have been extended to 
cover prescribed training schemes and employment programmes.32 Table 1 below 
lists the number of cases between 2000 and 2005 referred by Jobcentre staff, who 
had doubts about a claimant, to a Sector Decision Maker who decided whether the 
doubts were sufficiently well founded for a sanction to be imposed. 
 
                                           
29 It contains a contribution-based element, which lasts for 6 months (contributory unemployment benefit 
lasted for one year), which does not contain any dependent’s allowances, and an income-based or means-
tested element, which is intended to cover the needs of the unemployed person and his/her household. JSA 
is paid at different rates for different age groups – there is a very low rate for those exceptional cases of 
people under 18 who are entitled to it, a reduced rate for those aged 18-24, and a standard rate for those 
aged 25 or over. Considering that average earnings for full-time adult employees were £457 pw in April 
2007, that median earnings for men in full-time employment were £498 pw for men and £394 pw for 
women, and that the standard rate of means-tested JSA is £60.50 pw, it is clear that Jobseekers Allowance 
provides very inadequate protection for most people. It is uprated annually in line with prices rather than 
wages and, in recent years, has fallen further behind the average increase in wages. 
30 For details see Wikeley and Ogus (2005, p. 373, n. 324). 
31 See Wikeley and Ogus (2005, p. 375). 
 
32 Like the sanctions for breaching a ‘Jobseeker’s Direction’, the training-related sanctions are non-
discretionary. Claimants are disqualified for two weeks for a first breach, for four weeks for a second 
breach within 12 months and for of 26 weeks for another breach within 12 months of the second breach. 
The latter penalty is particularly draconian. For a detailed account of the sanctions themselves, see Wike-
ley and Ogus (2005, pp. 375-6). For a review of the sanctions regime, which includes an account of its 
impact on claimants, see Peters and Joyce (2006).  




Table 1: Sanctions imposed on Unemployed Claimants, April 2000 – August 2005 
 
Type of decision Cases referred for 
decision 




Variable length:    
Leaving employment volun-
tarily 
1,385,590 32 443,388 
Refusal of employment 439,490 40 175.796 
Lost employment through 
misconduct 
358,490 26 93,207 
Neglect to avail of an oppor-
tunity of employment 
1,100 25 275 
Discharge from H M Forces 230 15 35 
Fixed length:    
Giving up a place on a train-
ing scheme or an employ-
ment programme 
36,990 55 20,345 
Losing a place on a training 
scheme or an employment 
programme 
67,510 62 41,856 
Refusal of a place on a train-
ing scheme or an employ-
ment programme 
4,600 66 3,036 
Neglect to avail of a place on 
a training scheme or an em-
ployment programme 
3,930 51 2,004 
Failure to attend a place on 
a training scheme or an em-
ployment programme 
197,950 61 120,750 
Refusal to carry out a 
Jobseekers Direction 
41,510 64 26,566 
 
Source: Peters and Joyce (2006, Table D2). 
 
 
From the above, it is clear that, although most referrals do not result in the imposi-
tion of sanctions, this is a commonplace event. 927,458 sanctions were imposed 
over the period April 2000-August 2005, corresponding to an annual rate of 
173,898 sanctions per year. Of this total, 133,631 (76.8 per cent) related directly to 
the circumstances in which a claimant left their previous employment or the refusal 
of an offer of employment, while 40,266 (23.2 per cent) were fixed-term sanctions 
imposed on those who did not fulfill their training or job search responsibilities. 
Claimants who disagree with the imposition of a sanction can ask for the decision 
to be ‘reconsidered’ and it is reported that approximately 20 per cent of the sanc-
tions imposed for leaving work voluntarily are lifted in this way.33 However, no 
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systematic data is available. There is likewise no systematic data on the number of 
appeals against the imposition of sanctions or the outcome of these appeals al-
though anecdotal evidence suggests that appeals against sanctions are now rela-
tively uncommon.34 
Although most people appear to support the government’s commitment to se-
curing employment for those who are out of work, and there is some evidence that 
the measures introduced by the government have contributed to the high employ-
ment rate and the relatively low levels of unemployment in the UK,35 there is a 
danger that its approach may become excessively authoritarian. The government’s 
obsession with social security fraud and the widespread use of television adver-
tisements,36 which encourage the public to treat those in receipt of social security 
with suspicion, reinforce the efforts of social get claimants off benefit and into 
work. As a result, claimants who are not really capable of work may be pressurised 
into seeking work and subjected to sanctions when they fail to obtain it and this 
emphasis on work may lead to the stigmatising of people on benefit. The applica-
tion to recipients of Incapacity Benefit of many aspects of the regime that was de-
veloped for recipients of Jobseekers’ Allowance, e.g. frequent attendance at work-
focused interviews with a Personal Adviser, was intended to produce a further shift 
in the boundary between those who can and those who cannot work, and to result in 
further reductions in the number of people on benefit. 
Under the Welfare Reform Act 2007, the process is being accelerated with the 
aim of getting 1 million of the 2.7 million claimants who are currently in receipt of 
Incapacity Benefit back into employment. Incapacity Benefit, and Income Support 
paid on the grounds of incapacity, will be scrapped in October 2008 and replaced 
by a new Employment and Support Allowance (ESA), which will have a new, 
stricter test of disability than the test that was used for Incapacity Benefit.37 Those 
who cannot engage in work-related activity will receive a 'support component'. 
Those who can engage in work-related activity will receive a 'work-related activity 
component' but may be required to undertake a work-focused health-related as-
sessment aimed at providing additional information about their functional capacity; 
to attend a work-focused interview to discuss what steps they can take to move to-
wards work; or to undertake activities, such as work trials, training, or attending a 
programme designed to help them manage their condition, which would increase 
their likelihood of getting a job. 
Claimants who are assessed as not being able to take part in any work-related 
activity (the minority who are most severely disabled) will not be expected to take 
part in work-focused activities unless they want to and will not be subject to any 
sanctions. They will receive a minimum of £89.50 a week and will be given a guar-
                                           
34 Wikeley (personal communication). 
35 The evidence is summarised in National Audit Office (2006). 
36 In particular, 'Targeting fraud' and 'We're onto you'. See Grover (2005) 
 
37 The revised disability test aims to assess what an individual can do, rather than what an individual can-
not do and will look at things such as a person's ability to use a computer keyboard or mouse. Some 
20,000 people a year are expected to come off benefit as a result of the change. See DWP (2007). 




anteed income of £102.10 a week. Everyone in this group will benefit since the 
long-term rate for Incapacity Benefit is currently £84.50 a week but the poorest will 
benefit most. Claimants who are assessed as capable of taking part in some form of 
work-related activity (the majority who are less severely disabled) will be entitled 
to claim ESA at £84.50 a week, i.e. at the same rate as Incapacity Benefit. They 
will be required to attend work-focused interviews, which are intended to help them 
overcome barriers to work and support them into sustainable employment, and their 
benefit may be cut if they do not do so.38 
The shift from a contribution-based approach first to a 
status-based approach and then to a reciprocity-based ap-
proach to citizenship 
The Balance between Rights and Responsibilities 
Underpinning the New Deal is a shift in the way government perceives the rela-
tionship between the state and the claimant. The government referred to this as ‘a 
change in the contract between the state and the individual’,39 which involved new 
rights for the claimant in return for the acceptance of new responsibilities. The 
new rights included the right to expect government to guarantee the availability of 
good quality job-search advice, training opportunities and employment (in a nor-
mal, unsubsidised job or in a job subsidised by the state). The new responsibilities 
involved an obligation to take full advantage of these opportunities. A ‘hand-up’ 
rather than a ‘hand-out’ became the new mantra: work rather than benefits became 
the main route to social security, and the New Deal was central to the new strat-
egy.40 
This new approach reflected, in part, the government’s dissatisfaction with the 
emphasis in the passive approach outlined above on rights and the neglect of re-
sponsibilities. In order to understand its concern, it will be helpful to clarify the 
meaning of rights and responsibilities and their relationship to citizenship. 
A right is an enforceable claim and individuals who have rights can enforce 
their claims against other individuals, corporate entities or the state. Moral rights, 
which are enforceable by appeals to morality, can be distinguished from legal 
rights, which are enforceable by appeals to the law, if necessary through appeals 
to the courts. If we were to say that everyone has a right to a job then, in the ab-
sence of any commitment by government to enforce this, we would be asserting a 
moral right. However, if, by acting as employer of last resort, the government 
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39 Department of Social Security (1998). 
40 The new strategy contained a number of other components, e.g. the introduction of a national minimum 
wage and much greater emphasis on in-work benefits delivered through tax credits. For accounts of the 
new strategy, see Millar (2003) and Adler (2004). 




were prepared to guarantee that jobs could be found for everyone, e.g. by acting 
as employer of last resort, we would be asserting a legal right. What is at issue 
here are legal rights that people might wish to enforce against the government, for 
example the right to social security, and whether these rights should entail respon-
sibilities for the rights holder. 
Citizenship as a Contested Concept 
Citizenship is one of a set of moral and political concepts known as ‘essentially 
contested concepts’41. As such, it can be defined in relatively uncontentious, un-
controversial way but is open to a range of interpretations. Thus, it can be defined 
in terms of the rights and duties that people enjoy as a result of being members of 
a community. However, this leaves open the nature of the rights and duties, the 
balance between them, and the identity of the community (which may be a nation 
state but may equally be the international community) referred to in the definition. 
Disagreements over these issues are unlikely ever to be finally settled and it is this 
fact that, in my view, makes citizenship an ‘essentially contested concept’. 
The traditional view of citizenship, which is associated with the writings of T. 
H. Marshall42, is that social rights, which include the right to social security, are 
an essential component of citizenship. Marshall defines citizenship as ‘a status 
that is bestowed on everyone who is a full member of a community’ and draws 
attention to the tension or contradiction between the idea of citizenship and the 
operation of markets in a capitalist society. This is because citizenship is an egali-
tarian concept while capitalism inevitably involves economic and social inequali-
ties. Marshall believed that citizenship could not only co-exist with and amelio-
rate these inequalities but could also legitimate them and make them more accept-
able, and that the post-war welfare state provided the institutional means for re-
solving the conflict between individual choice, freedom, markets and capitalism 
on the one hand, and collective welfare, equality, politics and socialism on the 
other. 
Marshall argued that citizenship comprises three clusters of rights: civil rights, 
political rights and social rights. 
• Civil rights refer to rights which are necessary for individual freedom 
(freedom of movement, freedom of assembly, freedom of speech and 
freedom of religion), the right to own property and conclude valid con-
tracts, and the right to justice (habeus corpus, i.e. freedom from arbitrary 
arrest, the assumption of innocence until proven guilty, and the right to 
a fair trial) 
• Political rights comprise the right to participate in the exercise of politi-
cal power both as a voter and as a candidate 
                                           
41 Gallie (1964). 
42 Marshall (1963). 




• Social rights embrace the right to ‘a modicum of economic welfare and 
security and to live the life of a civilised person according to the stan-
dards of society’. 
Each of the three clusters of rights is associated with a different set of institutions. 
Thus, civil rights are intimately bound up with and, in theory, protected by the 
courts; political rights are linked to parliament; while social rights are − at least in 
Britain − associated with the social services, i.e. with the provision of benefits 
(like social security) and services (like health care and education) by the state. 
According to Marshall, citizenship as such did not exist in feudal society. The 
formative period for civil rights was the 18th century (more exactly the period be-
tween the Reformation and the first Reform Act in 1832), for political rights it 
was the nineteenth century and for social rights it was the twentieth century, al-
though there was clearly some overlap. Thus, the process was both sequential and 
evolutionary (civil rights came first, political rights next and social rights last) and 
the welfare state was to be understood as the culmination of this evolutionary 
process. 
Although Marshall’s thesis has been very influential, it has also generated a 
great deal of criticism. It has been criticised by comparative scholars (like Mi-
chael Mann43) on the grounds that it is entirely about Britain and other countries 
do not fit the British model and because the evidence from other countries sug-
gests that citizenship is not necessarily built up in the sequence Marshall de-
scribes. The experience of other countries makes it clear that capitalism does not 
necessarily lead to the welfare state 
This criticism has enabled right-wing liberals (like Norman Barry44) to criti-
cise Marshall for presenting a left-wing justification for the welfare state. These 
critics argue that citizenship is made up of civil and political rights only and that 
‘social rights’ are not really a component of citizenship because they can only be 
achieved at the expense of other, more fundamental, rights, in particular property 
rights. Thus, for example, a ‘right’ to social security pre-supposes a social secu-
rity system paid for out of taxation but the principle of taxation is inconsistent 
with respect for property rights. 
It has also been criticised by internationalists (like Yasemin Soysal45) for 
adopting a national conception of citizenship and for ignoring its international 
dimension, i.e. the rights (and responsibilities) people have in common as citizens 
of states that are governed by international treaties and conventions. Soysal de-
velops a more universal conception of citizenship, based on ‘universal person-
hood’ rather than ‘national belonging’, that finds expression in international trea-
ties and conventions like the UN Declaration on Human Rights, the European 
Convention on Human Rights, and numerous agreements of international bodies 
like the ILO, the WHO and other UN agencies. Although some of these interna-
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tional treaties and Conventions, e.g. UN Declaration on Human Rights, lack any 
means of enforcement and are merely aspirational, others, e.g. the European Con-
vention on Human Rights, can be enforced and clearly do add an extra dimension 
to the meaning of citizenship. 
Another criticism has come from feminists (like Ruth Lister46) who criticise 
Marshall for focusing on the effects of citizenship on class inequalities and for ig-
noring its effects on other forms of inequality, in particular gender inequalities. 
Marshall conceived of the citizen as an independent, autonomous male actor who 
participates as an individual in the labour market and in the political process and 
receives benefits and services on the basis of individual entitlement. However, 
this conceptualisation does not fit the circumstances of women with dependent 
children who are often excluded from full participation in the market, whose par-
ticipation in politics is frequently limited by their caring responsibilities, and for 
whom the receipt of benefits may reflect their dependent status within the house-
hold. 
It has also been criticised by communitarians (like Amitai Etzioni47) for its 
emphasis on rights and its neglect of responsibilities. These critics argue that citi-
zenship should take account of responsibilities as well as rights and that it should 
attempt to seek a proper balance between them. Such a balancing act could pro-
vide the basis for an active form of citizenship in which people are required to do 
things for society as well as expecting society to do things for them. 
It is the fifth criticism that concerns us here. The passive approach to social 
security regards social security as an unconditional right, i.e. as something which 
those who are citizens should be able to claim ‘as of right’ and without any condi-
tions attached. The active approach to social security is critical of this one-sided 
emphasis on rights, arguing that a ‘something for nothing’ approach results in 
people making demands against the state without feeling any obligation to con-
tribute anything to society, that it leads to ‘welfare dependency’ which is not only 
costly for society because it involves supporting people who ought to be able to 
support themselves, creates ‘perverse incentives’, undermines the work ethic and 
the nuclear family, and is conducive to anti-social behavior. 
Contribution-Based, Status-Based and Reciprocity-Based Conceptions of So-
cial Citizenship 
In a series of articles, the political theorist Raymond Plant48 has argued that, over 
a long period, the British welfare state has oscillated between two contrasting no-
tions of social citizenship and has analysed recent reforms to the social security 
system associated with welfare to work programmes and the New Deal in terms of 
these contrasting notions. 
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The first of these notions regards citizenship as a status that is not fundamen-
tally altered by the virtue (or lack of it) of the individual and is not concerned with 
whether (or not) the individual is making a recognised contribution to society. On 
this view, status and membership are the crucial issues rather than whether the 
person lives a life which others approve of or makes a positive contribution to so-
ciety as a whole. This notion of citizenship is associated with negative rights 
(rights not to be interfered with) and positive rights (rights to what Plant calls ‘the 
socio-economic conditions of citizenship’, i.e. to health care, education and wel-
fare. Thus, whether or not a person lives a life that is approved of by others, as 
long as that person does not interfere with others, he or she should be secure in his 
or her rights, both negative and positive. 
The second of these notions places less emphasis on rights and focuses instead 
on virtue, contribution and reciprocity. According to this view, citizenship is not a 
pre-existing status but is, rather, something that people earn by fulfilling their ob-
ligations to society. Citizenship is, therefore, an achievement rather than a status. 
It follows that individuals do not have a right to the resources of society unless 
they have contributed to it by working or by engaging in some other socially val-
ued activity, assuming that they are in a position to do so. 
Plant argues that these two notions of citizenship have informed the develop-
ment of the British welfare state. According to him, the Poor Law, which was the 
earliest form of public provision for those who were unable to provide for them-
selves, was based neither on contribution nor on contract but on mere membership 
of the community and it is in this sense it embodied the first notion of citizenship. 
This is a somewhat unusual claim in the sense that three of the key features of the 
Poor Law were punishing the ‘able bodied’, i.e. those who were capable of work, 
in ‘houses of correction’; requiring households to exhaust their own resources be-
fore providing relief; and depriving those in receipt of relief of their civil and po-
litical rights. However, the Poor Law did provide relief, of sorts, for those who 
were deemed to lack virtue, whose lives were not approved of, because they were 
unwilling or unable to support themselves. This approach stands in complete con-
trast with an insurance-based approach, in which the benefits that people receive 
when they are no longer able to work are based on the contributions they pay 
when they are able to do so. In this approach, which embodies the second notion 
of citizenship, benefits are earned by those who fulfill their obligations to society 
by working. 
Beveridge embraced the contributory principle and made a sharp distinction 
between insurance and assistance, believing that social security should be based 
on participation in the labour market and the payment of insurance contributions 
when in work. As he wrote in his famous report, ‘[b]enefit in return for contribu-
tions, not free allowances from the state, is what the people of Britain desire’49. 
He believed that citizenship had to be earned and was a strong exponent of the 
achievement view. During the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, i.e. during the heyday of 
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what critics have termed the ‘entitlement society’, the distinction between insur-
ance-based and tax-financed benefits became rather blurred as the status view 
came into its own. This was, in part, due to the fact that, because insurance bene-
fits did not provide an adequate level of income support, increasing numbers of 
people, many of whom had been in employment and had paid insurance contribu-
tions, were forced to claim assistance and this development made it impossible to 
sustain the rigid distinction between insurance and assistance. It was also partly 
due to the impact of the ‘welfare rights movement’, which sought to uphold and 
strengthen the social rights of poor people, many of whom were dependent on so-
cial assistance, in order to promote their citizenship. However, the return of a La-
bour government in 1997, after 18 years in opposition, soon called into question 
the idea of an unconditional right to benefit. It made its preference for an recip-
rocity-based notion rather than a status-based notion of citizenship clear. 
Plant lists seven reasons for this change in emphasis: 
• The government was concerned about dependency and the ways in which 
recipients of benefits can cut themselves off from ‘the disciplines, the so-
ciability, the growth of knowledge and the confidence’ that come from be-
ing in the labour market. 
• It feared that the ‘moral hazard’ of claiming benefits as of right would fos-
ter the ‘habits of mind and character’ that trap individuals in poverty and 
prevent them from rejoining the labour market. 
• It was concerned with the broader issue of ‘free riding’, in which non-
contributory benefits for some are funded from the taxes that are paid by 
those in work, many of whom are themselves low paid. It took the view that 
people should not be free to choose a life on benefit since the costs fall on 
others who take their obligations to work more seriously. 
• It did not believe that taxpayers were prepared to fund benefits at a level 
that would lift recipients out of poverty. 
• It did not believe that taxpayers should fund benefits at this level since, be-
cause of globalisation, they have to compete with workers in countries with 
lower taxation. 
• It placed a great deal of emphasis on the development of human and social 
capital in order to improve their chances in the labour market and help them 
find a way out of poverty. 
• It was committed to promoting equality of opportunity, rather than equality 
of outcome, and wished to improve the employability of the worst off. 
 
This reasoning, which showed how much the government had been influenced by 
right wing, free-marketeering critics of state welfare,50 led the government in the 
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direction of policies that emphasised reciprocity and obligation. However, it is 
important to point out that this did not involve endorsing contributory benefits. 
This is because, in order to prevent large-scale dependence on social assistance, 
such a strategy would have called for a massively expanded social insurance 
scheme and the large-scale crediting in of people with insufficient contributions, 
with all the attendant problems that would have entailed. In any case, contributory 
benefits, which create rights to benefit, involve a retrospective, ex ante, form of 
reciprocity based on the contributions that an unemployed person paid when 
he/she was in work, and the government wished to promote a more contempora-
neous, current or ex post, form of reciprocity in which, in the case of an unem-
ployed person, looking for a job, undertaking training to enhance employability, 
or undertaking social beneficial activities secure the right to benefit. In a system 
of contributory benefits, virtue is established through prior attachment to the la-
bour market and the payment of national insurance contributions. In a system of 
non-contributory benefits, virtue is established through the concurrent fulfillment 
of reciprocal, work-related obligations. In both cases, the enjoyment of citizenship 
rights, in this case the right to social security, depends on the establishment of vir-
tue. 
As far as welfare to work schemes and the New Deal are concerned, Plant 
warned that, if work were to become the passport to economic and social citizen-
ship, stringent work tests to distinguish those who can work from those who genu-
inely cannot would be required. Likewise, there would have to be a very strong 
commitment to equipping those currently outside the labour market with the skills 
that employers want. Plant pointed to the limits of what could be achieved with 
the ‘one-off’ windfall tax and argued that, to ensure that there was work for eve-
ryone who is looking for it, the state would need to act as ‘employer of last re-
sort’. He thought this was essential if the government was to keep its side of the 
bargain but, because it would be very expensive, he thought it was most unlikely 
that it would be prepared to commit itself to that. Events have proved him right. 
He also argued that, unless the government was careful with its rhetoric, there was 
a real danger that those who were not able to work, and thus not able to satisfy the 
pre-conditions for contribution-based citizenship, would become an increasingly 
stigmatised group. 
The account of changes in notions of social citizenship presented here is 
somewhat more nuanced than that proposed by Plant. While Plant identified two 
contrasting notions of social citizenship – a contribution-based notion and a 
status-based notion – we contend that there are actually three contrasting notions– 
a contribution-based notion, a status-based notion and a reciprocity-based notion. 
Thus, rather than arguing that the British welfare state has oscillated between a 
contribution-based notion and a status-based notion, we contend that it has 
evolved first from a contribution-based notion to a status-based notion and then 
from a status-based to a reciprocity-based notion of social citizenship. Although 
the contribution-based notion and the reciprocity-based notion both make social 
citizenship rights conditional, in the first case on prior attachment to the labour 




market and the payment of national insurance contributions and, in the second 
case, on the concurrent fulfillment of work-related obligations, they represent 
very different forms of conditionality. 
The shift from a more bureaucratic and legalistic type of de-
cision-making to a more professional and managerial one 
Normative Models of Administrative Decision-Making 
We now turn to an examination of the implications of the New Deal for the ac-
countability of officials and the rights of redress that are available to the claimant. 
We do so by identifying and comparing a number of models of administrative de-
cision-making and by developing an approach that was originally put forward by 
the American public lawyer Jerry Mashaw.51 
In his pioneering study of the American Disability Insurance (DI) scheme,52 
Mashaw detected three broad strands of criticism leveled against it: the first in-
dicted it for lacking adequate management controls and producing inconsistent 
decisions, the second for not providing a good service and failing to rehabilitate 
those who were dependent on it, and the third for not paying enough attention to 
‘due process’ and failing to respect and uphold the rights of those dependent on it. 
He claimed that each strand of criticism reflected a different normative conception 
of the DI scheme, i.e. a different model of what the scheme could and should be 
like. The three models were respectively identified with bureaucratic rationality, 
professional treatment and moral judgment. 
Mashaw defined ‘administrative justice’ (i.e. the justice inherent in routine 
day-to-day administration) in terms of ‘those qualities of a decision process that 
provide arguments for the acceptability of its decisions’.53 It follows that each of 
the three models he described is associated with a different conception of admin-
istrative justice. Thus, there is one conception of administrative justice based on 
bureaucratic rationality, another based on professional treatment and a third based 
on moral judgment. According to Mashaw, each of these models is associated 
with a different set of legitimating values, different primary goals, a different or-
ganisational structure and different cognitive techniques. Mashaw’s analytic 
framework is set out in the Table 2 below. 
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interpersonal clinical application 
of knowledge 
Moral Judgment fairness conflict resolu-
tion 
independent contextual  
interpretation 
 
Although this is very helpful, the association of fairness with one of the models (the 
moral judgment model), and the implication that the two other models are ‘unfair’, 
is unfortunate. In addition, the characterisation of the three models reflects an ex-
clusively internal orientation to administrative justice in that it does not refer to ex-
ternal mechanisms for redressing grievances. With these considerations in mind, 
Table 1 has been modified and a revised analytic framework is set out in Table 2 
below. 
In Table 3, the three models have been re-named − they are referred to as a bu-
reaucratic model, a professional model and a legal model, the ways in which they 
are characterised have been revised, and redress mechanisms, which include exter-
nal as well as internal procedures for achieving administrative justice, highlighted. 
This is important because internal and external procedures should not be seen as 
alternatives and are, in practice, often combined. 
 
Table 3: Models of Administrative Justice − Revised Analytic Framework 
 




Mode of  
Accountability 
Mode of redress 
Bureaucratic applying rules accuracy hierarchical administrative  
review 
Professional applying  
knowledge 
public service interpersonal complaint to a  
professional body 
Legal asserting rights legality independent appeal to a court or 
tribunal 
 
Mashaw claimed that each of the models is coherent, plausible and attractive and 
that the three models are competitive rather than mutually exclusive.54 Thus, they 
can and do coexist with each other. However, other things being equal, the more 
there is of one, the less there will be of the other two. His insight enables us to see 
both what trade-offs are made between the three models in particular cases and 
what different sets of trade-offs might be more desirable. His approach is a plural-
istic one, which recognises a plurality of normative positions and acknowledges 
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that situations, which are attractive for some people may be unattractive for oth-
ers.55 
The trade-offs that are made, and likewise those that could be made, reflect the 
concerns and the bargaining strengths of the institutional actors who have an inter-
est in promoting each of the models, typically civil servants and officials in the case 
of the bureaucratic model; professionals and ‘street level bureaucrats’56 in the case 
of the professional model; and lawyers, court and tribunal personnel and groups 
representing clients’ interests in the case of the legal model. They vary between or-
ganisations and, within a given organisation, between the different policies deliv-
ered by that organisation, and between the different stages of policy implementa-
tion. They also vary over time and between countries. 
Although, in my opinion, Mashaw’s approach is a very imaginative and fruitful 
one, it has been subjected to a number of criticisms. Although Mashaw believed 
that the three models described above, and only these three models, are always pre-
sent in welfare administration, this claim can be disputed since the bureaucratic, 
professional and legal models have, in many countries, been challenged by other 
models of decision-making, in particular, by a managerial model associated with 
the rise of new public management, a consumerist model which focuses on the in-
creased participation of consumers in decision-making, and a market model which 
emphasises consumer choice. 
A second criticism is that, in assessing the relative influence of the three mod-
els, Mashaw ignored their absolute strengths. Consider two situations in which the 
strengths of three models are given weights of 30, 20 and 10 units and 3, 2 and 1 
units – although they are identical in a relative sense, they are quite different in ab-
solute terms and clearly refer to what are, in reality, very different situations’. 
‘Strong’ balances are very different from ‘weak’ ones in ways that Mashaw’s 
analysis does not bring out very well. 
A third criticism is that Mashaw takes the policy context for granted. However, 
just as different orientations to administration, i.e. to how programmes should be 
run, can be understood in terms of a number of normative models which are in 
competition with each other, so different orientations to policy, i.e. to what pro-
grammes aim to achieve, can also be understood in this way. In a study of penal de-
cision-making,57 I attempted to demonstrate that Mashaw’s approach can be applied 
to competing models of policy as well as to competing models of administration. 
Each of several competing models of policy may, in theory, be combined with each 
of several competing models of administration. The resulting ‘two-dimensional’ 
model is necessarily more complex but its characteristics are similar in that it not 
only makes it possible to understand the trade-offs that are made between different 
                                           
55 Mashaw’s pluralism can be contrasted with the version of pluralism adopted by other writers on justice, 
most notably by Michael Walzer, who assumes a degree of normative consensus in a given community 
that stands in stark contrast with Mashaw’s assumption of normative conflict.  See Walzer (1985, espe-
cially chapter 1). 
56 Lipsky (1980). 
57 Adler and Longhurst (1994). 




combinations of policy and administration in particular cases, but also makes it 
possible to see what different sets of trade-offs might be more desirable. 
In light of the criticisms above, Mashaw’s analytic framework can be extended 
in a number of ways. A revised and extended analytic framework is set out in Table 
4 below. 
 
Table 4: Models of Administrative Justice − Revised and Extended Analytic 
Framework 
 




Mode of  
Accountability 
Mode of redress 
Bureaucratic 
 
applying rules accuracy hierarchical administrative review
Professional applying  
knowledge 
public service interpersonal second opinion or 
complaint to a pro-
fessional body 
Legal asserting rights legality independent appeal to a court or 
tribunal (public law) 







none, other than  
adverse publicity 















to owners or 
shareholders 
(profits) 
‘exit’ and/or court  
action (private law) 
 
A brief explanation of this extended analytic framework is called for. During the 
post-war period, most public welfare services in the United Kingdom were shaped 
by the bureaucratic and professional models outlined above, although the trade off 
between them varied from one policy domain to another. However, by the mid-
1980s this pattern of administration came under attack. It was variously criticised 
for lacking neutrality and being biased against certain groups; for having a vested 
interest in the maintenance and expansion of existing empires and for not promot-
ing the ‘public interest’; and, as a ‘monopoly provider’ for being insulated from 
competitive pressures to become more efficient and more responsive to the de-
mands and preferences of consumers. New and better forms of management were 
championed as the most appropriate response to these criticisms. Managerialism, as 
this approach came to be known, challenged the powers and prerogatives of bu-
reaucrats and professionals in the name of managers who demanded the ‘freedom 
to manage’ the attainment of prescribed standards of service. It gave priority to 
achieving efficiency gains, introduced different forms of financial and management 




audit to assess how well the prescribed standards of service had been met, rewarded 
staff who performed well and, in theory at least, sanctioned those who did not.58 In-
evitably, the introduction of these new managers frequently led to struggles for 
power and control within welfare organisations. Managerialism can thus be charac-
terised in terms of managerial autonomy, enhanced standards of service, the devel-
opment of performance indicators and the use of audit. However, it lacks a redress 
mechanism and, apart from drawing attention to poor standards of service in order 
to put pressure on management, there is little that a dissatisfied service user can do. 
Consumerism has, likewise been a central reference point in the drive for public 
sector reform from the mid-1980s onwards.59 Like managerialism, it has been taken 
up as a response to criticisms of the bureaucratic and professional and the reshaping 
of welfare services around consumer choice has been visible in a number of re-
forms, in particular in the introduction in the UK of the ‘Citizen’s Charter’. Con-
sumerism embodies a more active view of the service user who is seen as an active 
participant in the process rather than a passive recipient of bureaucratic, profes-
sional or managerial decisions. It can thus be characterised in terms of the active 
participation of consumers in decision-making, consumer satisfaction, the introduc-
tion of consumer ‘charters’, and the use of ‘voice’60 together with the possibility of 
obtaining compensation if the standards specified in the charter are not met as 
available remedies. 
Markets constitute the final model in the extended analytic framework and have 
many of the characteristics of the managerial and consumerist models (although the 
reverse is not necessarily the case). Decision-making in the market involves con-
sumer choice and the matching of supply and demand. Consumers are viewed as 
rational economic actors who choose what best satisfies their wants or preferences 
while producers are profit maximisers who compete with each other. The legitimat-
ing goal of the organisation is economic efficiency and the prevailing mode of ac-
countability is to the owners or shareholders. In contrast to consumerism, where the 
consumer can use ‘voice’ as a remedy, and can obtain compensation through the 
consumer charters if the specified standards have not been met, markets provide the 
possibility of ‘exit’. In addition, an aggrieved individual may be able to raise a 
court action for compensation where he or she suffers some measurable loss from 
an administrative decision. Internal or quasi-markets61 have some but not all of the 
characteristics of the market model just outlined. 
Decision- Making and Appeals in Social Security 
The origins of the system of administrative decision-making in social security can 
be traced back to the introduction of social insurance under the National Insurance 
Act of 1911. This established two important principles. The first of these involved 
                                           
58 Clarke and Newman (1997). 
 
59 Ibid., chapter 6 
60 Hirschman (1970). 
61 Le Grand (1991), Le Grand and Bartlett (1993). 




the separation of responsibilities for making decisions under the law from the ad-
ministrative tasks associated with the processing of claims and the second gave 
claimants the right of appeal against these decisions.62 These appeals were not to 
the civil courts but to specially constituted tribunals, comprising a legally-qualified 
chair, a member representing employers and a member representing trade unions, 
that were set up to hear them. By the early 1930s, a three tier system of adjudica-
tion had evolved. Initial decisions concerning entitlement to benefit were taken by 
‘insurance officers’, appeals from them were heard by ‘referees’ (the forerunners of 
national insurance local tribunals) in the first instance, and from them, on points of 
law, to ‘umpires’ (the predecessors of the national insurance commissioners), who 
were lawyers of standing and whose decisions acted as precedents that first and 
second-tier decision makers were expected to follow. However, there was no right 
of appeal on purely administrative matters that were deemed to be the responsibility 
of the Minister. The Beveridge Report recommended the continuation of these ar-
rangements, which were written into the post-war legislation and continued in exis-
tence until the early 1980s. 
The system of administrative decision-making and appeals in social assistance 
was very different and can be traced back to the Unemployment Assistance Act of 
1934, which created a national assistance scheme for the unemployed.63 This pro-
vided for the right of appeal from the decision of an official to a local tribunal. 
However, unlike insurance officers, unemployment assistance officers were not ex-
pected to make independent decisions but were, rather, expected to carry out the 
policies of the Unemployment Assistance Board. Unemployment assistance tribu-
nals (which were later renamed national assistance tribunals) were lay bodies that 
lacked the independence of national insurance tribunals. Since there was no further 
right of appeal, their decisions were final. The Beveridge Report recommended the 
continuation of these arrangements and this was written into the National Assis-
tance Act 1946. However, under the impact of the welfare rights movement, the 
successors of national assistance tribunals, known as supplementary benefit appeal 
tribunals, were subjected to a great deal of criticism in the mid-1970s.64 They were 
widely criticised for their lack of ‘fairness, openness and impartiality’65 and for fail-
                                           
62 These arrangements were intended to protect Ministers from being held to account, and answerable in 
Parliament, for the huge number of decisions concerning entitlement to benefit. 
63 See Lynes (1975). 
64 See Bell (1975) and Adler and Bradley (1975). 
65 These three principles were put forward in the Report of the Franks Committee (1957). However, 
Franks regarded National Assistance Appeal Tribunals as sui generis and exempted them from its stric-
tures and recommendations that applied to all the other tribunals it considered. For an account of its think-
ing, see Bradley (1975). 




ing to control the exercise of discretion by the Supplementary Benefits Commis-
sion,66 which replaced the National Assistance Board in 1966. 
These criticisms led, first, to a series of piecemeal reforms and, then, to a com-
plete overhaul of the system of decision-making and appeals.67 Under the Health 
and Social Services and Social Security Act (HASSASSA) 1983, this involved in-
troduced a unified three-tier system of adjudication comprising Adjudication Offi-
cers (who replaced insurance officers and supplementary benefits officers), a uni-
fied social security appeal tribunal (which replaced national insurance appeal tribu-
nals and supplementary benefit appeal tribunals), the social security commissioners 
(whose jurisdiction covered supplementary benefits as well as national insurance 
benefits). Thus, the principle of independent adjudication was extended, for the first 
time, to social assistance. The legislation also established the new post of Chief Ad-
judication Officer (CAO), who was given the job of providing advice and guidance 
to Adjudication Officers and monitoring standards of decision-making. These ar-
rangements continued until 1998 although, since the establishment of the Social 
Fund in 1986, challenges to decisions concerning discretionary grants and loans 
have been handled separately, outside the appeal tribunal system.68 
The Social Security Act 1998 did away with the principle of independent adju-
dication and brought to an end the notional independence that adjudication officers 
had enjoyed since 1911. Adjudication Officers were replaced by ‘decision makers’ 
acting on behalf of the Secretary of State.69 The 1998 Act also abolished the role of 
the Chief Adjudication Officer and transferred the CAO’s role to the Chief Execu-
tives of the various agencies that were responsible for the provision of benefits and 
service to various client groups. These senior managers lack the independence of 
the CAO, who repeatedly drew attention to the poor standards of social security de-
cision-making, since they have an interest in playing down the poor standards 
                                           
66 According to David Donnison, who was Chairman of the Supplementary Benefits Commission, discre-
tionary additions to the basic rate of benefit (known as ‘exceptional circumstances additions’) and discre-
tionary grants (known as ‘exceptional needs payments’) were inappropriate in circumstances where the 
caseload was rising, there were no commensurate increases in staffing, and discretionary decisions were 
increasingly challenged through appeals to tribunals. See Donnison (1997 and 1982, chapters 5 and 6). 
67 For more detailed accounts, see Bradley (1985) and Sainsbury (2000). 
68 Applicants who wish to challenge the decision of a social fund officer may request an internal review of 
that decision by the officer who made the decision and by a manager in the local office. Applicants who 
wish to take the matter further may then request a further review by the Social Fund Inspectorate, which 
operates from a central office in Birmingham. The work of the inspectors is monitored by the Social Fund 
Commissioner.  For a fuller account of the operation of the Social Fund, which includes an account of the 
role of the Social Fund Inspectorate and the Social Fund Commissioner, see Buck (2000). 
69 For accounts of the impact of the 1998 Act on first instance and appellate decision making in social se-
curity, see Wikeley (2000) and National Audit Office (2003). 




achieved by decision-makers for whom they are responsible.70 The Act also at-
tempted to speed up and streamline appeal procedures by, for example, relaxing the 
requirement that tribunals should comprise a chair and two members in all cases 
but these changes do not really concern us here.71 However, a further change that 
does concern us, and which pre-dated the 1998 Act, was the requirement that, 
unless appellants specifically opted for an oral hearing, the tribunal would consider 
their case ‘on the papers only’, with no one present. 
The ‘success rate’ of paper hearings is much lower than that of oral hearings72 
and the introduction of paper hearings was at first associated with a fall in the ap-
pellant success rate. In 1995, the year immediately before the introduction of paper 
hearings, 43.9 per cent of hearings were decided in favour of the appellant73 and 
this fell to 34.5 per cent in 1997, the year immediately after their introduction.74 
However, in the period 2000-2005 (inclusive), the overall success rate has again 
been 43.9 per cent.75 During this period, the proportion of paper hearings has aver-
aged 26.2 per cent.76 
We are now in a position to consider the implications of these changes in terms 
of the models of administrative decision-making discussed in Section 3.1. 
Changes in the Form of Decision Making 
In a study of the adjudication in social security in Britain,77 John Baldwin, Nick 
Wikeley and Richard Young characterised the role of Adjudication Officers in the 
late 1980s as what I have called ‘bureaucratic’ and that of social security appeal tri-
bunals as what I have called ‘legal’ (see above).78 However, I think this is too sim-
ple. Readers will recall that Jerry Mashaw pointed out that that his three models of 
administrative justice were competitive rather than mutually exclusive and that they 
could and did coexist with each other. He also pointed out that, although one model 
                                           
70 To ensure public confidence, the Comptroller and Auditor General was asked to monitor the new ar-
rangements. However, in his assessment of the Secretary of State’s Report on Decision Making in 2002 
and 2003 (which was published in 2006), he reported that he was ‘unable to confirm that a substantial part 
of the information set out by the Secretary of State is fair or balanced’ and concluded that ‘unless all such 
performance data is subject to satisfactory quality assurance processes as to its robustness, the resultant 
report will be of limited utility as a measure of the Department’s success in improving the accuracy of de-
cision making’. See Department for Work and Pensions (2006, p. 20) 
71 For a fuller account of these changes, see Sainsbury (2000). 
72 In 2005, the last full year for which data are available, the appellant success rates for paper and oral hearings 
were 52.1 per cent and 22.5 per cent respectively. Figures based on statistics accessed at  
http://www.dwp.gov.uk/asd/qat.asp 
73 Department of Social Security (1997, Table H 5.03). 
74 Department of Social Security (1999, Table H 5.03). 
75 Figures based on statistics provided by Gillian Ferry, Client Statistics Team, DWP Information Direc-
torate. 
76 It has hardly fluctuated, ranging from 25.7 per cent in 2000 to 26.6 per cent in 2004 and 2005. 
77 Baldwin, Wikeley and Young (1992). 
78 In a subsequent article, Wikeley (2000, p. 499) claimed that, as a result of the 1998 Act, the bureaucratic 
model has ‘complete hegemony at the first-tier level’ and that the judicialisation of tribunals was ‘driven 
… by the policy imperatives of managerialism’. 




tended to be dominant, it could co-exist with the other two models. I think this was 
the case with first-instance decision makers and appeal tribunals when Baldwin, 
Wikeley and Young carried out their research. 
I accept that, when Baldwin, Wikeley and Young carried out their research, 
many Adjudication Officers did very little adjudication and that they simply author-
ised, with their signatures, decisions that had, in practice, been delegated to clerical 
staff.79 I also accept that they were increasingly required to give priority to meeting 
performance targets over fulfilling statutory requirements and that there were 
strong pressures on them to regard speed as more important than accuracy.80 Never-
theless, I do not think their characterisation of Adjudication Officers attaches suffi-
cient importance to their independent status or to the fact that claimants could ap-
peal against their decisions to an independent appeal tribunal. I can see elements of 
the ‘bureaucratic’ and the ‘legal’ model of administrative decision-making in their 
activities and would have characterised them in terms of a trade-off between these 
two models. I accept that the ‘professional’ model was important for some Adjudi-
cation Officers, especially for those who were responsible for the administration of 
discretionary provisions within the social security legislation, but that it was less 
important for most of them. Social Security Appeal Tribunals could likewise be 
characterised in terms of a trade-off between the ‘bureaucratic’ and the ‘legal’ 
model of administrative decision-making although, in this case, the latter was 
clearly dominant. 
We are now in a position to consider the impact of some the changes outlined in 
this chapter for the trade-offs between the different normative models outlined in 
Section 3.1 above and thus, for administrative justice in social security. Since there 
is little evidence, as yet, of user involvement in shaping the delivery of social secu-
rity81 and Jobcentre Plus has almost exclusive responsibility for implementing the 
New Deals,82 the discussion will not consider the consumerist or market models 
and will focus instead on the bureaucratic, professional, legal and managerial mod-
els. 
When Baldwin, Wikeley and Young undertook their fieldwork in 1989, the key 
decision-maker in the Department of Social Security was undoubtedly the Adjudi-
cation Officer in whose name all the decisions about whether or not claimants were 
                                           
79 This was in large part due to the HASSASSA Reforms of 1983 which, in theory, extended the principle 
of independent adjudication to supplementary benefit but, in practice, diminished its impact as the existing 
body of Adjudication Officers became responsible for a greatly increased number of decisions. According 
to Wikeley (personal communication), the old tradition continued to be evident in some offices but had 
been swept away in others where pressure of work had forced Adjudication Officers into doing ‘spot 
checks’ and signing off decisions relating to supplementary benefit that were made by clerical staff. 
80 Baldwin, Wikeley and Young (1992 pp. 40-41) noted that officers responsible for determining claims to 
national insurance benefits gave much higher priority to accuracy than officers responsible for determin-
ing claims to unemployment benefit and income support, who gave higher priority to speed. 
81 Lister (2001). 
82 There has been some small-scale experimentation with private and voluntary sector involvement in the 
New Deals (Stafford, 2003, p. 226) and more can be expected in the future (National Audit Office, 2006, 
para. 34). 




entitled to benefit were made. However, this is no longer the case. Adjudication Of-
ficers were abolished under the Social Security Act 1998 and, when Jobcentre Plus 
was established in 2002, one of its aims was to create a unified workforce from 
staff who previously worked for the Benefits Agency and the Employment Service. 
It is my contention that the key decision-maker in Jobcentre Plus is now the Per-
sonal Adviser, who manages a caseload of jobseekers and has considerable discre-
tion in carrying out this task. The decline of the Adjudication Officer and the rise of 
the Personal Adviser reflect a shift from a predominantly bureaucratic to a much 
more professional model of administrative decision-making.83 
Although Adjudication Officers were, at least notionally, independent, they 
were, in practice, increasingly accountable to their line managers. Accountability 
has increased greatly in recent years and Personal Advisers are now subject to vari-
ous forms of performance management and are expected to give priority to meeting 
a variety of nationally and locally set performance targets.84 This change reflects 
the increase in importance of the managerial model of administrative decision-
making. At the same time, the ending of the Adjudication Officers’ independent 
status and the abolition of the role of the Chief Adjudication Officer in 1998 have 
undoubtedly led to a reduction in the importance of the legal model of decision-
making. The weakening of claimants’ appeal rights, which resulted from the re-
moval of social fund decisions from the jurisdiction of appeal tribunals and the in-
troduction of ‘paper’ hearings, have had a similar effect. 
The changes described above suggest than, on the one hand, the bureaucratic 
and legal models of decision-making have decreased in importance while, on the 
other hand, the importance of the professional and managerial models of decision-
making has increased. The final section of the chapter considers the implications of 
these changes for rights of redress and accountability. 
The Implications of Changes in the Form of Decision Making for Rights of 
Redress and Accountability 
In their study of adjudication in social security, Baldwin, Wikeley and Young de-
scribed what happened when a claimant attempted to challenge a decision relating 
to their claim to benefit.85 The claimant could either request a review of the initial 
decision or lodge an appeal. Reviews were conducted either by the officer who 
                                           
83 In Australia, where activation measures have been contracted out to private and voluntary sector provid-
ers, Carney (2005) has identified a shift from a bureaucratic mode of decision making, which emphasises 
rules ad procedures, to a to a market mode of decision making, which emphasises discretion. 
84 In an attempt to reduce the burden that performance measurement places on Personal Advisers, Job-
centre Plus replaced its former Job Entry Target with a Job Outcome Target in April 2006. However, Job 
Outcome Target data will be collected at district level and will not make it possible to attribute job out-
comes to individual offices and advisers. Jobcentre Plus has also developed a set of alternative perform-
ance measures for Personal Advisers that focus on the content and quality of their work. See National Au-
dit Office (2006, paras. 44 and 45). 
85 Baldwin, Wikeley and Young (1992, pp. 65-67). 




made the initial decision86 or by a specialist officer87, while appeals were heard by 
an independent social security appeal tribunal. However, in practice, the receipt of 
an appeal would trigger off an informal review to establish whether the initial deci-
sion should stand and this would often lead to a formal review. If, after a formal re-
view, the claimant’s case was met in full, that would be the end of the matter, but, 
if it was only met in part or not at all, the case would proceed to a tribunal.88 
These two procedures (reviews and appeals) constitute the characteristic modes 
of redress associated with bureaucratic and legal models of decision-making (see 
right-hand column in Tables 2 and 3 above).89 The characteristic modes of redress 
associated with professional and managerial models of decision-making are much 
less well-developed. In discussing this issue (in Section 3.1 above), we suggested 
that the characteristic mode of redress associated with the professional model was a 
second opinion or a complaint to a professional body. However, although these 
mechanisms are usually available when the decision maker is a professional, this is 
rarely the case when the decision-maker is a semi-professional90 or a ‘street-level 
bureaucrat’91. In such cases, it is unlikely that a second opinion will be an option or 
that there will be a professional body to complain to. We also suggested that there 
was no effective mode of redress associated with the managerial model and that the 
only option available to someone who wished to make a complaint was to create 
adverse publicity. 
It is the contention of this chapter that the shift away from a situation in which 
bureaucratic and legal models of decision-making were dominant to one in which 
professional and managerial models of decision-making have greatly increased in 
importance has made it extremely difficult for anyone who is required to take part 
in any of the New Deal programmes to complain about the advice and help they are 
given or about any sanctions that may be imposed on them.92 In Jobcentre Plus, 
Personal Advisers have many characteristics associated with semi-professionals 
                                           
86 In the case of contributory (social insurance) benefits. 
87 In the case of means-tested (social assistance) benefits. 
88 When Baldwin, Wikeley and Young carried out their research, tribunals could consider the claimant’s 
situation at the time of the hearing. However, under section 12 (8) of the 1998 Act, they were precluded 
from taking into account circumstances that did not apply when the appealed-against decision was made 
and, under section 36, they could no longer consider issues that arose for the first time on appeal. 
89 If a claimant wants the decision-maker to look again at a decision, he/she can ask for it to be reconsid-
ered. Decisions may be revised if they are incorrect or superceded in light of fresh evidence. For the latest 
data on revisions and supercessions, see Department for Work and Pensions (2006). 
90 A semi-professional is someone, like a librarian, who works in an occupation which has some but not all 
the characteristics of a profession. The domain in which a semi-professional can make independent deci-
sions is smaller than that in which a professional can. See Etzioni (1969). 
91 A ‘street-level bureaucrat’ is an official, like a policeman on the beat, who works without direct supervi-
sion and is required to take ‘on-the-spot’ decisions by exercising his/her judgment. See Lipsky (1980). 
92 In Australia, Carney (2005) has noted that it has likewise become difficult to challenge the imposition of 
sanctions and the quality of the activation measures that are provided. 




and street level bureaucrats.93 They wield a great deal of power − they meet claim-
ants to discuss their work aspirations and options, assist them in searching for jobs, 
explore their training needs and the availability of training programmes, advise 
them on childcare and the availability of specialist services, such as services for 
those with drug or alcohol dependency, and make indicative calculations about 
whether or not they would be better off in work or on benefit. Many of them, un-
doubtedly, do their jobs very well and levels of user satisfaction are reported to be 
high.94 Although they are involved in the assessment of claims to Jobseekers Al-
lowance (JSA), standards of decision have not, until recently, been monitored on a 
national basis.95 
As described in Section 1.5 above, Jobcentre Plus staff can impose a range of 
sanctions, not only on claimants but also on their families, on those who fail to at-
tend work-focused interview with them, on those who cannot demonstrate that they 
are ‘actively seeking work’, on those who fail to attend a work interview and on 
those who turn down offers of ‘suitable’ work’. However, tribunals hear very few 
appeals against the imposition of sanctions and the staff who impose them are 
therefore effectively immune from challenge. The culture of independent adjudica-
tion and appeal has pretty much disappeared. Thus, staff are not really accountable, 
through internal or external audit, for their performance or to members of the public 
for the decisions they make. 
Conclusion 
It is the contention of this chapter that, however laudable the aims of the New Deal 
may be, each of the shifts that it has entailed − from a more passive type of inter-
vention to a more active type of intervention; from a contribution-based approach, 
first to a status-based approach and then to a reciprocity-based approach to citi-
zenship; and from a primarily bureaucratic and legalistic type of decision-making 
to a primarily professional and managerial one − is fraught with problems. The 
first shift is problematic because there is a real danger that those who are not really 
fit for work will be required to look for work and will be penalised – and feel a 
sense of failure − when they are unable to find it. The second shift is problematic 
because, by refusing to become the ‘employer of last resort’, there is a very real 
                                           
93 Wright (2003) has used Lipsky’s theory of street-level bureaucracy to analyse the ways in which the 
staff in a Jobcentre placed claimants into administrative and moral categories and traced the consequences 
of these processes for the services they received. Her study which was carried our in 1998, i.e. before the 
merger of the Benefits Agency with the Employment Service into Jobcentre Plus, drew attention to the 
discretion exercised by staff. She notes that the, as a result of subsequent policy developments, the impor-
tance of discretion has undoubtedly increased since then. 
94 According to the National Audit Office (2006, paras. 21 and 31), Jobcentre Plus’ customer survey 
shows that 77 per cent of jobseekers and 90 per cent of employers are satisfied with its performance. 
95 Department for Work and Pensions (2006, p. 11). According to this report, a monitoring scheme was 
introduced in 2005 and will provide the basis for future reports on standards of decision making in Job-
centre Plus. 




danger that if, and when, unemployment starts to rise, the government will lose 
credibility by not being able to deliver. The third shift is problematic because, al-
though Jobcentre Plus staff exercise a great deal of power over those who are look-
ing for work, it is increasingly difficult for job-seekers to challenge what the staff 
do or do not do for them. Although ‘Welfare to Work’ is a fine ideal, it should not 
be implemented without due regard to justice and fairness. 
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